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BOOK REVIEWS

MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

By Jon R. Waltz and Fred E. Inbau.

New York: The MacMillan Co., 1971. Pp. 398. $10.95.
The authors of Medical Jurisprudence do not tout the book
as an exhaustive treatise on medical malpractice or questions of
law unique to medical practice. Indeed, the authors candidly note
that they have written the book primarily for doctors or medical
students.
Certainly doctors or medical students, indeed any intelligent
layman interested in medical malpractice or in medical-legal problems, will find the book interesting and informative. The book
describes concisely and accurately the procedures and phases of
a trial. It states briefly the types and the sources of law. It even
describes such basic matters as how to locate reported decisions.
The practicing attorney can also find this book a useful one.
The scope of this book is very broad. Annotations, while not extensive, are sufficient on most points to provide an introduction
to primary source authority.
The authors discuss the general provisions and construction
of typical licensing statutes including grounds and procedures for
license suspension or revocation. The canons of medical ethics are
set out verbatim followed by a discussion of the due process protection available to the doctor expelled by his medical association.
Also included is a discussion of the inter-professional code for
physicians and attorneys. A full understanding of this code, particularly the provisions for medical reports, court appearances and
subpoenas, could avoid friction for lawyers as well as doctors.
Medical Jurisprudencetreats in detail the physician-patient privilege. The authors note the substantial decline in significance of
this privilege brought about not so much by the increasing depersonalization of the relationship as by the frustration of truth the
privilege causes in the courtroom. The authors note the trend toward
the position that the privilege is waived by the very act of commencing a lawsuit for personal injuries. In North Dakota, this
trend is followed at least by the district judges in the First Judicial
District, Cass County. The effect is to allow pre-trial discovery
of all prior medical history in any way relating to the injuries
for which the plaintiff claims damages.
Briefly mentioned is the doctor's role in the quest for an adequate
award of damages to compensate his patient for injuries covered
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by another's negligence. The authors note, however, the importance
of limiting medical testimony to a description of physical impairment. The doctor should not be allowed to express the physical
impairment in terms of a "degree of disability" because the latter
is simply not a medical conclusion. This view is also endorsed
by the American Medical Association,1 but rarely appreciated or
acknowledged by lawyers, doctors, or judges in this area.
A thorough and intelligent analysis of the Uniform Anatomical
2
Gift Act is offered. Attorneys should be familiar with this act
in the event they are requested to advise on a decision that could
determine whether a vital transplant can proceed. While the authors
note the various technicalities of the Act, they avoid any discussion
of the civil or criminal penalties that would result from its violation.
Primarily, however, this is a "hornbook" presentation of modern medical malpractice law. In this respect, the book could be
helpful to law students and attorneys as well as medical students
and doctors. The authors cover nearly every important phase of
current modern malpractice trends. They state the law concisely
and in most respects accurately.
The authors note that most malpractice actions sound in negligence and not breach of contract. The recent case of Guilmet
v. Campbell,3 not discussed in the book, could herald a change.
This significant decision held that mere pre-operative assurances
by the doctor raised a jury question of whether there was a "contract to cure."
A significant portion of the book discusses the necessary qualifications of an expert witness. The extreme limitations to which
most courts confine chiropractic testimony are unfortunately not
followed in North Dakota. Thus the statement that a chiropractor
testifying in a personal injury case will be restricted to opinions
regarding the nature and extent of physical conditions he has observed and prevented from stating a prognosis, 4 is not the rule
in North Dakota. The North Dakota Supreme Court allows the
chiropractor to testify to a medical certainty even as to a prognosis
of future medical disability. 5 Indeed, even in a malpractice case
against a physician and surgeon a chiropractor has been allowed
to testify to the taking and reading of x-rays. 6 The medical,
orthopedic and radiologic training of many chiropractors is sketchy
1. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PAIRMENT lit (1971).

GUIDES TO THE

EVALUATION

OF PERMANENT

IM-

2. N.D. CENT. CODnE ch. 23-06.1 (1969).
3. Gullmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
4. J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JVRIsPRuDENcE 62 (1971).
5. Klein v. Harper, 186 N.W.2d 426, 429-431 (N.D. 1971). See also Corbin v. Hettle,
Mich. App. _
192 N.W.2d 38 (1971) holding that a chiropractor could testify
that the injuries were permanent and that the plaintiff would never be free from pain.
6. Ness v. Yeomans, 60 N.D. 368, 234 N.W. 75, 76 (1931).
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at best and certainly not uniform as a whole. Hopefully, the position
of the North Dakota court regarding chiropractic testimony will
change.
The authors are unusually emphatic in proclaiming and hailing
the passing of the locality rule. They ignore quite a number of
recent cases from many jurisdictions, including North Dakota, that
retain the rule. 7 Basically the only argument advanced for discarding the rule is that it does nothing to encourage the upgrading
of medical practice in unspecified localities. It is not unrealistic
to suggest that most small communities in less populated states
would be happy to receive medical care from a general physician
even though he may not be able to stock his clinic with the latest
laboratory devices or follow the most recently cited techniques.
The law already requires the local doctor to recognize cases beyond
his capacity and to refer such cases to specialists or clinics competent to handle the case." The law already allows the claimant
to require the local doctor to testify as an expert witness even
though such testimony creates a prima facie case against the local
doctor." The local doctor, may also be cross-examined regarding
treatises or recent articles in medical journals by authorities the
doctor recognizes. 10 An unfortunate but probable result of discarding
the locality rule is that the physician's conduct will be judged
not by an expert familiar with the practice in his locality but
by an expert whose chief speciality is nationwide courtroom testimony in medical malpractice cases.
The authors discuss the recent development of "informed consent." They approve the position that medical expert testimony
is required in most cases to determine if sound medical' judgment
was exercised by the physician's disclosures to his patient prior
to obtaining consent for the procedure." Probably the most important aspect of this issue is the one least considered by the
courts. What is the appropriate measure of damages? The fairer
and more realistic measure suggested here is an award based
upon the difference between the condition if untreated and the
patient's condition following the procedure and occurrence of the
2
undisclosed risk.1

This book is intelligently written. It is informative on the law
7. Myer v. Moell, 186 Neb. 397, 183 N.W.2d 480 (1971); Benzmtller v. Swanson, 117
N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1962). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, at 73 (1965).
8. Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
9. Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968).
10. Id. at 517-518.
WALTZ & IF.
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J.

12.
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and provocative as to legal advances necessary. It should enjoy
a wide audience.
CARLTON

J.

HUNKE*

KENNEDY JUSTICE. By Victor Navasky. New York: Atheneum,
1970. Pp. 455. $10.00.
John F. Kennedy's naming of Robert F. Kennedy as United
States Attorney General caused a storm of criticism. Some of the
outcry stemmed from the circumstance that the two men were
brothers, in blood and in outlook; talk of political cronyism, as
recurrent as it is meaningless, gave way to rumblings about a
family dynasty, which might be something else again. Less emotional observers were concerned about 35-year-old Bobby Kennedy's
lack of legal experience: Yale law professor Alexander Bickel was
reported as having said, "On the record, [he] is not fit for
the office." But Robert Kennedy accepted the appointment, despite
his own misgivings, because his brother Jack had told him, "I've
got to have you. I need the help of my brother more than I need
anyone else."
In three years Robert F. Kennedy had resigned his Justice
Department assignment to begin his doomed climb toward the office
from which his brother, now dead, had appointed him. Since it
is much easier to view with alarm than it is to weigh accumulated
evidence, for some eight years-despite all the initial controversythere has been no useful assessment of Robert Kennedy's tenure
as Attorney General. There is one now and it will greatly interest
lawyers.
Victor Navasky, a Yale Law School graduate who is best known
as founder of the satirical political journal Monocle and as a frequent
commentator in the New York Times Magazine, has written a serious,
analytical, important, tantalizing book about the Kennedy years
at Justice. It is a serious book in the sense that it is not a
collection of reminiscences or of backstairs gossip-Navasky is sparing of anecdotal material-and it is not of the read-it-to-weep genre
of Kennedy books. It is analytical in the sense that its author,
not content simply to disgorge five years of research, has focused
his considerable intelligence on the significance of his evidence
and has tried to organize it and make some sense of it. It is an
important book because Navasky, having worked so hard for so
0 J.D., 1967, University of North Dakota; 1967-1968, Law Clerk for United State
Court of Appeals Chief Judge Charles J. Vogel; Partner, Wattam, Vogel, Vogel & Peterson, Fargo, North Dakota.
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long, has produced a genuinely illuminating study that informs
us, as in his early pages he promised to do, about the delicate,
dangerous interplay between the short-term federal planner and
the mammoth, entrenched bureaucracy with which he must work
if his administration's policies are to draw a living breath. The
book is tantalizing in the sense that, despite Navasky's admirable
efforts, one remains irritatingly unclear as to the measure of credit
Attorney General Kennedy could claim for the undeniable fact that
new things got done, some of them quite satisfactorily, during
his tenure. In a broader sense it is tantalizing in that, much
as we may wish to, we cannot with any real assurance project
its subject's interrupted course.
Navasky has discerned the primary codes by which Kennedy,
willingly or unwillingly, had to live. In part because the Federal
Bureau of Investigation accounts for 41 per cent of Justice's budget
and 42 per cent of its manpower, but more subtly because the
maximum cabinet officer ("My brother, the President . . .") was
pitted against the ultimate bureaucrat ("Mr. Hoover became the
Director of the Bureau in 1924, the year before the Attorney General
was born"-the FBI Tour Guide), Kennedy Justice inevitably deals
in one lengthy part with The Code of the FBI. Because Kennedy
deliberately surrounded himself with a battery of lieutenants from
elitist Eastern law schools ("A bunch of Yale Law types recruited
by 'Whizzer' White," one Harvard man who did not make the
team has said), Part II of Kennedy Justice is devoted to The Code
of the Ivy League Gentleman. Finally, of course, there is, as there
had to be, a section on The Code of the Kennedys.
It would be a disservice to Navasky's detailed treatment
of complex topics to give compressed descriptions of his book's
fascinating specifics. Those who wonder whether Kennedy authorized
the FBI's tapping of Martin Luther King's telephone must read
the book, not a precis of it, and the same holds true for those
who want to know how and why Kennedy set out to destroy Jimmie
Hoffa. A reviewer of this book should, I think, restrict himself
to a few of the general conclusions that are justified by Navasky's
careful dissection of a whole series of situations.
In any battle between charisma and a fully organized bureaucracy, charisma will lose. So it was with Kennedy and J. Edgar
Hoover's FBI, and Kennedy seemed early to realize this. He who
had the last clear chance to pry Hoover from his post not only
did not do so but quickly adopted a policy of non-confrontation
with the Bureau. More than that, in one Faustian bargain after
another-mostly to gain a little Bureau support for his war on
organized crime and, later, some minimal involvement in the civil
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rights field"-Kennedy enlarged the Buraau's jurisdiction and its
budget. Navasky, whose obvious desire to admire Robert Kennedy
rarely overpowers his analytic faculties, is reduced to the humiliating
conclusion that "Hoover was the jockey, and Kennedy was the
horse." On the way to this determination Navasky provides a brilliant interpretation of the FBI as a full-fledged secret society possessing enormous, ominous power.
The Code of the Ivy League Gentleman committed Robert Kennedy to the faiths inculcated in young law students, mainly at
the Yale Law School, during the 40's and early 50's. These faiths
included a belief that patient, reasonable men can achieve desirable
change through mediation rather than by crude confrontations. Nowhere was this attitude more evident than in Kennedy's ceaseless
negotiations with Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi, during which
the Attorney General sought assurances that James Meredith could
register as a student at "Ole Miss" without getting lynched. I
think it must be concluded that Kennedy, at least in this notorious
instance, was again outmaneuvered and ultimately captured, this
time not by agile bureaucrats but by men who appreciated the
tactical advantages of lying through one's teeth. A gentleman's
code works only with gentlemen.
Although Navasky never makes it quite clear how Ivy League
conventions contributed to the Kennedy administration's wretched
record of Southern judicial appointments, he establishes that no
aspect of Kennedy's attorney generalship is more vulnerable to
criticism than his part in the selection of at least five racist
federal judges who dealt crippling blows to the civil rights expectations that Kennedy had belatedly recognized. For Robert Kennedy,
judge-picking became an extension of politics, an approach that,
however much it might comport with James Eastland's conceptions
of senatorial courtesy, flatly contradicted some of John Kennedy's
loftier oratory. It is undeniable that Robert Kennedy abetted the
appointment of judges who would call black litigants "chimpanzees."
The conflicting codes of bureaucracy and of Ivy League lawyering did not prevent Kennedy from adhering to his elaborate familial
code. In describing the operation of Kennedy family strictures,
Navasky comes closest to the man Robert Kennedy. His clan's
code made Kennedy strive for excellence, to be brave, to try,
where he could see it, to take the humane position. Navasky takes
as an example Kennedy's reaction to the plight of James Landis,
1. Robert F. Kennedy's interest in civil rights, on any level other than the merely
rhetorical, came late. .I recall having been mildly surprised when, early in Kennedy's
tenure as Attorney General, a career man at Justice remarked privately to me that
"Bobby couldn't care less about civil rights. You Just can't move him. He's too busy
being a gangbuster." My friend might have added that Kennedy was then very busy
trying, sometimes by extralegal means, to bring Hoffa to his knees.
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a former dean of the Harvard Law School and a friend and adviser
of the Kennedys who, having gotten eccentric if not psychotic,
let five years go by without paying his taxes. Kennedy's role
in the politically sensitive Landis case does him credit and suggests
that everything about him was not tough and heartless.
The flaws of Kennedy Justice as a book are mostly inconsequential. Navasky engages too often in the annoying condescension
of prefacing his points with a statement of what the point is not;
here and there his book turns into an ode to the Yale Law School,
which bothers even me, a graduate of the place; the book is overorganized in that portions of its text are only remotely related
to Navasky's-or his editor's-numerous and ambitious section headings.
The only truly unsatisfying thing about Kennedy Justice was
unavoidable. It is the most frustrating aspct of Navasky's study
that his repeated efforts to convey Kennedy's "most significant
achievements" culminate in anticlimax: he was stylish, he was
tenacious; he could draw good people to him and he knew how
to delegate responsibility; he was willing to tackle neglected problems; he was no yes-man to the President. (He was also partial,
impulsive, an occasional believer in the end justifying the means,
and he was morally chargeable with some of the FBI's grosser
iniquities.) Navasky shows Kennedy's spirit enlarging; he cannot
tell us how large it would have grown. But, because Robert Kennedy
was not allowed to complete his own record, let alone his older
brother's, we must be deeply grateful for this thoughtful, ambiguous
book about the most demanding period of his short life.
JON

THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND

R. WALTZ*

THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSUR-

By Jeffrey O'Connell. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1971. Pp. 253. $8.50.
Begin with the fact that 45 per cent of all those severely
injured in auto accidents receive absolutely nothing in compensation
from their automobile liability insurance while 85 per cent of those
with $10,000 or more in economic loss are reimbursed less than
half their loss. Add to this the fact that 56 cents of every insurance
dollar is chewed up in insurance overhead and legal fees. Then
consider the difficulty in ascertaining who was at fault in the
ANCE.

J.D., 1954, Yale Law School; Professor of Law, Northwestern University School
of Law.
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auto accident and that 50 to 80 per cent of the civil litigation
in our overcrowded courts are faced precisely with that problem.
Finally, consider the skyrocketing cost of automobile insurance.
The conclusion is always the same; something is seriously wrong
with our automobile insurance system.
The myriad of inadequacies and shortcomings of the fault system of automobile liability insurance has produced an equal number
of new proposals and suggestions for reform.
At the forefront
of these new ideas is the concept of no-fault insurance originally
proposed by the author, Jeffrey O'Connell, in conjunction with Professor Robert E. Keeton of the Harvard Law School.
For the purposes of analysis, the book can be conveniently
divided into two topics. Roughly speaking, the first half concerns
serious criticisms of the present automobile insurance system while
the second half is devoted to the panacea of no-fault insurance.
The author's major criticism of the present system is its requirement that one driver must be proven to have been entirely
at fault. His view is that not only is it time consuming but highly
conjectural. The procedure is inherently bad because it usually
means forcing a witness to remember unrememberable details
which are necessary to reach a final determination.
Another criticism of the present system is the practice of lump
sum payments made upon final settlement of the case. Usually
this payment is made months, even years, after the accident and
in the meantime the victim is financially forced to forego necessary rehabilitative programs for his injury. The author notes the
problem has been mitigated somewhat by the practice of some
insurance companies making advance payments to claimants in
situations where its liability is reasonably certain. This enables
the claimant to partake in a rehabilitative program with the only
condition being that the advance payment be deducted from the
final settlement. However, advance payments are used much too
infrequently with only 8 per cent of the seriously injured receiving
them.1 Consequently, the majority of victims must forego rehabilitation until the lump sum payment is received upon final settlement
when the victim is often beyond the rehabilitative stage.
One of the reasons for insurance companies being hesitant to
advance payments to victims where liability is certain is because
of the adversary nature of the fault system. Under the adversary
system, the insurance company owes no loyalty to the claimant.
This is often manifested in hostile treatment on the part of he
insurance company. For example, it will intentionally delay settle1.
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ment knowing its bargaining power increases with the passage
of time because the claimant needs the money quickly.
The author places much criticism on the fault system's practice of paying for pain and suffering and duplicating payments
from other sources, both of which comprise a large portion of
the compensation of the claimant. The author recommends their
abolishment primarily on the basis of reducing the insurance premium. Further justification for the elimination of pain and suffering payments is found, not on the merits of such compensation,
but simply because it is rather preposterous to place a dollar
value on pain and suffering. On the other hand, a meritorious argument is used in concluding that duplicating payments should be
abolished. The gist of the rationale is that the victim should only
be compensated for genuine out-of-pocket losses. Consequently, automobile insurance should only indemnify after insurance from other
sources, e.g., medical insurance and sick pay from unions, has run
out.
The author concludes his criticism of the present system by
focusing on the increasing difficulty of obtaining insurance. Costs
are becoming so onerous that some companies are abandoning
some markets entirely while others are increasing the number
of persons in high-risk categories and refusing to sell them insurance. Consequently, many applicants are being arbitrarily rejected
on questionable grounds and forced to seek coverage under "assigned
risk" plans 2 or through sub-standard insurers. Both alternatives
are costly and often the insured finds himself with inferior coverage. Because of this new practice of insurers towards high-risk
applicants and also because of the generally high cost of insurance
for everyone, the nation is confronted with the dangerous situation
where 20 per cent of all motorists have no liability insurance
whatsoever.3
Throughout the book the author is not hesitant to blast the
legal profession. Indeed, it appears that every shortcoming of the
present system is accentuated by rapacious attorneys. Lawyers
are alleged to engage in prodding their clients to the brink of
perjury in order to shift the blame for the accident on the defendant,
for encouraging high medical bills to increase pain and suffering
claims, and even for forcing their clients to accept a lump sum
payment so the legal fees will be received in a more convenient
2. Assigned risk plans are programs set up in every state to handle those motorists
rejected by standard companies in the voluntary market. These motorists are assigned
to insurance companies for coverage on a rotating basis, dependent upon the amount of
insurance written by the various companies in that state.
3.
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form. The author condemns the lawyers' use of the contingent
fee as the method of billing. His rationale is that the contingent
fee is tantamount to making the lawyer co-owner of the claim
which results in the lawyer using every conceivable means to increase the size of the claim. Finally, lurid examples are given
of the lawyers' use of professional ambulance chasers. Lawyers
in large cities are said to employ persons whose sole job is to
watch for automobile accidents and then urge them to sign a retainer with the attorney, often while the victim is still in shock from
the accident. Admittedly, the author places most of the blame
on the system itself, but a lawyer might well question the alleged
extent of the corruption.
The second portion of the book deals with the proposed advantages of no-fault insurance. While not an absolute talisman,
the author believes it will cure many of the ills existent in the
present system.
The greatest benefit of no-fault insurance is the reduction of
insurance premiums. The reduction will be primarily due to the
elimination of litigation to determine who was at fault, pain and
suffering payments, and the duplication of payments when the victim has other types of insurance covering the same injury.
In addition to a reduction of cost, no-fault insurance will result
in advantages in other areas which are often overlooked. For example, the author believes there will be a more intelligent and
balanced weighing of the risks of potential insureds. This is because
the fault system only takes into account the rather speculative
consideration of whether you are likely to be involved in an accident.
It does not take into account what you would be paid once an
accident occurs. Consequently, those who are considered more likely
to have accidents (for example, the young and the old) are charged
very high rates, despite the fact that when they are in accidents
their losses are comparatively smaller. Under no-fault the high
risk motorist's insurance rates will be reduced and, more importantly, insurance will be available to many more people. The author
suggests that no-fault insurance will also lead to safer cars. This
is because the insurance company will be paying for the loss and
therefore able to rate its customer's car according to its injury
proof features.
The author admits that no-fault insurance is not without its
critics. The principal argument appeals to one's sense of justice
in that everyone should be responsible for his own wrong-doing.
The author feels this is a weak argument because one's "wrong"
in a traffic accident consists of a momentary motoring slip of
the type that everyone is guilty of again and again. Furthermore,
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he refers to recent studies which show that most accidents are
caused by events beyond the driver's control such as environmental
factors and defects in the automobile. Finally he points out that
under the fault system the wrongdoer is not only allowed but
required to pass the payment for his guilt to an insurance company and thus his only financial loss will be the possible increase
in his insurance premium.
Much consideration is given to the provisions of the various
no-fault proposals including the one the author and Robert E. Keeton
submitted. Basically the various proposals differ in the areas of
whether it should be compulsory or voluntary, the upper limit
of no-fault, if anything should be paid for pain and suffering and,
if so, to what degree, and whether or not tort claims should be
allowed in addition to the no-fault coverage. It might be noted
the author is generally in favor of tort claims above the limit
of no-fault compensation. This is because the author feels that
when there is great psychic loss suffered (for example, when a
victim loses a limb) the individual is not fully compensated by
merely being reimbursed for out-of-pocket losses.
The pros and cons of different elements of no-fault insurance
are discussed in the first three appendices of the book. The consequences of the different elements when placed in different for4
mulas illustrate the complexity of insurance.
If you are a lawyer, do not expect this book to be entertaining.
One might easily argue about the many advantages of the present
fault system which the author scarcely takes note of. However,
whether one is in favor of no-fault insurance or not, chances are
that some form of no-fault will eventually be enacted either by
the federal government or the states. The book will then serve
as an excellent introduction into the field of no-fault insurance.
ROBERT

E.

RoSENVOLD*

4. The book also contains a fourth appendix which is an excerpt from a Congressional
Report in March of 1971 by the Department of Transporation. The report represents an
extensive study made of the present automobile insurance system and recognizes many
of the same problems that the author mentions. Indeed, much of the author's material
appears to be based on this study.
* Third year student

